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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Justin Wicklund appeals from the denial of his claim for post-conviction relief
following an evidentiary hearing. He asserts that he presented sufficient evidence to
demonstrate his trial attorney's performance was objectively deficient and that there
was a reasonable probability that his sentencing hearing would have been different,
had counsel performed sufficiently. The district court pointed out that there were two
potential factual scenarios that existed at the end of the evidence: that counsel had
not investigated the dismissed charge from 2009, or that counsel had investigated the
dismissed charge and chose not to present evidence in that regard to the district court
in the new case. Mr. Wicklund argues on appeal that a preponderance of the evidence
demonstrates that counsel's performance was objectively deficient and prejudicial under
either scenario, and so, regardless of which scenario existed, he met his burden of
proof.
The State's response demonstrates a misunderstanding of those arguments in
the alterative.

It believes that, simply because Mr. Wicklund did not prove which

scenario existed, he failed to carry his burden. That, however, is not an element that
Mr. Wicklund was required to prove under the Strickland test, 1 especially given the
specific facts of his case. The test for ineffective assistance of counsel only requires
that Mr. Wicklund demonstrate that his attorney's performance was objectively
unreasonable and prejudicial, which he did. He must demonstrate both prongs of the
Strickland test by a preponderance of the evidence (i.e., show it is more likely true that

1

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).

1

his attorney performed ineffectively and prejudicially). However, the State believes that
Mr. Wicklund was also required to show the exact factual scenario that unfolded.

In

doing so, it ignores the fact that, under either scenario, Mr. Wicklund met his burden.
Because he demonstrated ineffective assistance under either scenario, it is not
necessary to prove which scenario existed.

Regardless of which was true,

Mr. Wicklund still proved the elements of an ineffective assistance claim under
Strickland, and therefore, the State's contention in this regard is meritless.
The State's response also demonstrates a misunderstanding of the prejudice
prong of the Strickland analysis.

It contends that Mr. Wicklund has to demonstrate that

a different result would have resulted in absence of the error.

That interpretation is

contradictory to the standard in Strickland itself. It has also been subsequently rejected
by the United States Supreme Court and Idaho's courts.

All Mr. Wicklund needs to

show to demonstrate prejudice is a reasonable possibility that the outcome would have
been different. Applying the correct standard, Mr. Wicklund did show prejudice by a
preponderance of the evidence. Therefore, this Court should reverse the district court's
decision to deny Mr. Wicklund's petition for post-conviction relief.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Wicklund's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but
are incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUE

Whether the district court erred when it denied Mr. Wicklund's petition for postconviction relief

3

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Wicklund's Petition For
Post-Conviction Relief
A.

The State Is Mistaken Regarding The First Prong Of The Strickland Analysis;
Mr. Wicklund Did Prove Objectively Deficient Performance In Both Of The
Alternative Factual Scenarios That Could Have Existed In This Case
Under the first prong of the Strickland test, Mr. Wicklund was required to prove

that his attorney performed in an objectively unreasonable manner.

Strickland, 466

U.S. at 687; Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 561 (2006). In this case, upon the close
of evidence, the district court determined that two potential factual scenarios could exist.
The State contends that, because Mr. Wicklund did not prove which of those two
scenarios actually existed, his claim must fail.

(Resp. Br., pp.9-10, 12-13.)

That

argument, however, misunderstands the standard in Strickland. The only thing that a
petitioner must prove is that, in a given factual scenario, his attorney's performance fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. Since
the preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that Mr. Wicklund's attorney
performed ineffectively in both of the identified factual scenarios, he met the Strickland
standard.
In a post-conviction case, the petitioner only needs to prove his claims by a
"preponderance of the evidence."

See State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 560 (2008);

Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 56 (2004). This means that he only needs to show that,
based on a consideration of all the evidence presented, it is more likely than not that his
version of events is true. Oxley v. Medicine Rock Specialties, Inc., 139 Idaho 476, 481
(2003) ("A preponderance of the evidence means that when weighing all of the
evidence in the record, the evidence on which the finder of fact relies is more probably
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true than not."); In re Beyer,_ P.3d _ , 2013 Opinion No.32, p.5 (Ct. App. 2013) ("A
preponderance of the evidence means that the evidence shows something to be more
probably true than not."). In this case, Mr. Wicklund presented evidence to support his
claims, and the State presented no evidence to weigh against his evidence. As such,
Mr. Wicklund contends that he has met the preponderance burden.
In this case, Mr. Wicklund has proven that his attorney's performance fell below
that objective standard in two alternative situations. 2 In the first alternative scenario,
Mr. Wicklund's attorney failed to sufficiently investigate Mr. Wicklund's prior criminal
history (specifically, the dismissed 2009 charge),

even though,

as the State

acknowledges, trial counsel was aware that the past charge existed and was aware of
the damage the nature of the charge itself (as it existed, unexplained) could do. (See
Resp. Br., p.10.) However, it is objectively unreasonable for an attorney to not conduct
investigations on evidence which, when known to a reasonable attorney, would lead
that reasonable attorney to investigate further, particularly if the prosecution will
probably rely on that evidence.

See Murphy v. State, 143 Idaho 139, 146 (Ct. App.

2006); see a/so, e.g, Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 519-38 (2003) (finding that

Admittedly, had Mr. Wicklund failed to show objectively deficient performance
under either scenario, the State's contention in this regard may have some merit.
Mr. Wicklund simply made his task more difficult by arguing both of the alternative
factual scenarios. (See R., p.9 (alleging in item E that counsel was unaware of the
nature of the 2009 case, indicating a failure to investigate it at all); R., p.73 (asserting
that trial counsel "did not object enough" in regard to the 2009 Affidavit, indicating the
failure was in not adequately presenting evidence in that regard).) However, just
because the task is harder does not mean that it cannot be successful completed. In
this case, the uncontradicted testimony from Mr. Rockstahl established that trial
counsel's performance was deficient under both scenarios. Therefore, Mr. Wicklund
presented sufficient evidence to overcome the burden he set for himself, demonstrating
that his attorney's performance was objectively unreasonable in both of the scenarios at
issue. Therefore, in this particular case, it does not matter which scenario existed
because, regardless, Mr. Wicklund has met his burden under Strickland.
2
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counsel's failure to conduct an investigation into potentially mitigating evidence was
objectively unreasonable and prejudicial under Strickland); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.
362, 390-99 (2000) (same) . Mr. Rockstahl testified that a reasonable attorney would
conduct additional investigation on this sort of information. (Tr., Vol.2, p.14, L.19 - p.15,
L.6.)

That testimony was uncontradicted and Mr. Rockstahl did not recant that

testimony on cross-examination. 3 (See generally Tr., Vol.2.) Therefore, Mr. Wicklund
met his burden to prove that counsel's performance was objectively unreasonable by a
preponderance of the evidence under the first alternative scenario.
In the second alternative scenario, Mr. Wicklund's attorney had gathered this
information but failed to present it to the district court. Part of counsel's job is to present
mitigating evidence at sentencing.
2007).

Knutsen v. State, 144 Idaho 433, 443 (Ct. App.

Again, Mr. Rockstahl offered uncontradicted testimony that a reasonable

attorney would present this sort of mitigating information to the district court, especially
given the particular facts of this case. (Tr., Vol.2, p.14, L.19 - p.15, L.6.) Again, the
State did not present any evidence to the contrary on this point, nor did Mr. Rockstahl

The State contends that Mr. Rockstahl made certain concessions on crossexamination which undermine his overall testimony. (See Resp. Br., pp.9, 12.) It is
mistaken. Those concessions were in regard to a tangentially relevant fact Mr. Rockstahl's personal opinion about the credibility of the alleged victim of the 2009
crime. (Tr., Vol.2, p.17, L.8 - p.19, L.11.) Mr. Rockstahl's personal conclusion about
the credibility of the witness is irrelevant to whether Mr. Wicklund's attorney performed
in an objectively reasonable manner in regard to trial counsel's investigation of the 2009
case. Even if Mr. Rockstahl's opinion was not based on a discussion with the victim, it
still would have been important for trial counsel to know that Mr. Rockstahl had found
those witnesses, and if trial counsel still had concerns about the veracity of
Mr. Rockstahl's opinion of the alleged victim's story, he could, and indeed, should have
conducted additional investigation based on Mr. Rockstahl's opinion. See Murphy, 143
Idaho at 146. Therefore, the State's contention about Mr. Rockstahl's concessions
actually only further proves that trial counsel's performance was objectively
unreasonable under Strickland.
3
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recant that testimony. (See generally Tr., Vol.2.) As such, Mr. Wicklund met his met his
burden to prove that counsel's performance was objectively unreasonable by a
preponderance of the evidence under the second alternative scenario as well.
Therefore, Mr. Wicklund met his burden under either of the alternative scenarios,
and so met his burden under Strickland.

As such, he only needed to prove, by a

preponderance of the evidence, that he was prejudiced by counsel's ineffective
performance, in order to merit relief. As he did so, this Court should reverse the district
court's decision to deny his claim for post-conviction relief.

B.

The State Misunderstands The Applicable Standard Under The Prejudice Prong
Of The Strickland Test
The State argues that, because Mr. Wicklund did not prove that the outcome of

his sentencing would have been different had counsel performed in an objectively
reasonable manner, he failed to prove the prejudice prong under Strickland.

(See

Resp. Br., p.13 ("It is difficult to imagine any such argument would change the court's
view of the allegations in the 2009 Affidavit in any positive way.") (emphasis added).)
That position has been rejected by the courts.

Strickland only requires that the

petitioner show "that there is a reasonable possibility" that the outcome would have
been different.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (emphasis added).

The Supreme Court

defined a reasonable probability as a showing sufficient to "undermine confidence in the
outcome" of the hearing.

Id.

(emphasis added).

Undermining confidence in an

outcome is not the same as requiring an affirmative showing that a particular alternative
outcome would necessarily exist: "We note that the prejudice prong does not require
proof that counsel's errors would have altered the outcome of the proceedings. Rather
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it requires a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's inadequate performance, the
outcome would have been different." Knutsen, 144 Idaho at 443-44 (internal citations
omitted); see also Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 175 (1986) (pointing out that the
reasonable probability standard does not require the petitioner to show that his
attorney's deficient performance more likely than not altered the outcome of the
hearing); cf. State v. Day, 154 Idaho 476, 482 (Ct. App. 2013) (emphasizing the same
point when analyzing a similar standard to show prejudice under Idaho's fundamental
error test).
The reasonable probability standard recognizes the fundamental difference
between requiring the defendant to make an affirmative showing that "the outcome
would have been different," as opposed to demonstrating "the reasonable possibility
that the outcome would have been different." The State's response fails to grasp this
fundamental distinction. (See Resp. Br., p.13 (arguing that Mr. Wicklund was required
to show that he would have received a more favorable sentence had his attorney
performed in a reasonably objective manner).)

As such, the State's assertion that

Mr. Wicklund needed to make a showing that the outcome of his sentencing hearing
would be affirmatively different in order to obtain relief misunderstands the law and
should be rejected, as it has previously been rejected by the courts. See Nix, 475 U.S.
at 175; Knutsen, 144 Idaho at 443-44; cf. Day, 154 Idaho at 482.
In any case, Mr. Wicklund did prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
there was a reasonable possibility that counsel's errors impacted the ultimate outcome.
The district court asserted that "there have been incidents involving similar behavior"
based on the 2009 Affidavit, which was, in turn, based only on the alleged victim's
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statements.

(Tr., Vol.4, p.26, Ls.5-7.)

However, Mr. Rockstahl testified that he had

contacted several witnesses who contradicted the complaining witness's version of
events (i.e., were willing to testify that the complaining witness's version of events was
not true). (Tr., Vol.2, p.16, Ls.10-11.) There is assuredly a reasonable possibility that

the district court, having been informed that the claims in the 2009 Affidavit were
contradicted, to the point that the defense attorney on the case believed that the State
did not feel it had a case, would not then make the factually-erroneous assertion that
"the potential for future risk I find is significant, and the potential for societal harm where
there has been incidents involving similar behavior," since such a finding would be
clearly erroneous in light of a full understanding of the 2009 case. As such, there is a
reasonable possibility that the sentence would be more lenient because there would not

have been the finding of similar past behavior, which the district court weighed as an
aggravating factor. Therefore, the uncontradicted evidence in this regard (the testimony
of Mr. Rockstahl) proves by a preponderance of the evidence that there is a reasonable
possibility that the outcome would have been different, had trial counsel performed in an
objectively reasonable manner.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Wicklund respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's
order denying his petition for post-conviction relief and remand for further proceedings.
DATED this 30 th day of August, 2013.

B AN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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